oligopolistic
conditions. Moreover, when positive network externalities (or economies of density) induce these airlines to use hub-and-spoke type networks, with different airlines using different hubs, these oligopolies may be asymmetric. A substantial share of congestion costs may then in fact not be external effects, but internal instead, in the sense that the travel delays imposed by one service upon other services would often concern services of that same operator, who can be assumed to take these firm internal congestion effects already into account when designing a profit-maximizing price and frequency schedule for the hub (Brueckner, 2002) .
A further implication of oligopolistic competition would be that another distortion, besides congestion, is likely to be present, namely that of strategic interaction between competitors with the result of non-competitive pricing. Absent congestion, consumer prices may then exceed marginal costs, implying that an economic argument for subsidization rather than taxation would exist. As pointed out by Buchanan (1969) and Baumol and Oates (1988) in the context of a polluting monopolistic ftrm, the implication for Pigouvian externality pricing is that the second-best optimal tax would be below the marginal external costs and may even become negative. This would provide a second argument, in addition to the point raised by Brueckner (2002) , of why optimal congestion charges at a hub would be below marginal external congestion costs if straightforwardly defined as the value of a single service's marginal delay costs for all other services.
This paper aims to investigate such issues in a network environment, by developing a model that is cast in terms of aviation and considers second-best congestion pricing for incoming and outgoing flights at airports. The model extends an earlier model of second-best pricing in congested road networks (Verhoe_ 2002). The second-best circun_tances under which congestion tolls have to be set are those just mentioned. We comider a simple network with multiple nodes, where both airlines and passengers suffer from congestion at airports.
Three types of interacting players are present in our model: a regulatory authority, airlines, and passengers; each having their own objective. Congestion tolls can be determined by a single regulator for all airports in the network, but also by "local" regulators of specific airports. "Competition" between local regulators then becomes an issue. The insights developed may of course often carry over directly to congestion pricing at nodes for different modes than aviation, and possibly even different types of networks, provided market conditions are similar to those considered here.
Airportcongestion pricing has alreadyreceived some attention in theliterature.Carfin and Park (1970)estimatedtheexternal costof a peak-period landingatLaGuardiawas $2000 (in 1969 $) ;about twenty times the actuallandingfee,althoughthisnumber should not be interpreted as an equih'briumcongestiontoll. Oum and Zhang (1990) examine the relation between congestion toils and capacity costs, and find that when capacity investment is lumpy-, the cost recovery theorem (which states that congestion toll revenues just cover amortized capacity (expansion) costs under constant returns to scale) no longer holds. Daniel (1995 Daniel ( , 2001 ) combines stochastic queuing theory with a Vickrey-type bottleneck model, and simulation results show that congestion pricing causes a redistribution of flights over the day, where smaller aircraft may divert to other airports because they value their use less than the social cost of using the congested airport. Bmeckner (2002) analyzes airport congestion pricing when airlines are nonatomistic, and concludes that there may be only a limited or even no role for congestion pricing when the number of airlines using the node decreases, as the share of internalized congestion costs increases.Brueckner (2003) analyzes airport congestion pricing in a network setting, and finds that the airline specific toilequals (one minus an airline's flight share) multiplied by the congestion damage caused by the airline.
The slructure of the paper is as follows. First, the notation and assumptions will be presented in Section 2. Section 3 contains the (profit) maximization model for the network operators (airlines).Section4 contains the regulator's optimization presents a simple numerical solution, and Section 6 concludes.
problem. Section 5
NOTATION AND ASSUMPTIONS
In the model, we distinguish three different parties. Passengers wish to travel between an origin and destination (a formulation with freight transport with atomistic demanders would be comparable to the one given here). In order to do so, services of an airline are necessary.
Airlines, in turn, need the services of two (origin and destination) or more (in case of indirect services) airports. Prices for the use of the airport may be set by a profit maximizmgairport operator or a welfare maximizing regulator, authority. Because we are concerned with (second-best) optimal airport prices, we will be considering a regulatory authority alone. An extension of the model to four types of players (regulators, airport operators, airlines and passengers) is considered as an interesting option for future work.
For the general specification of the model, a number of assumptions are made that will now be presented.
Assumption 1. A given passenger's trip in an origin-destinationj pair will involve one airline only. The inverse demand function in each market is linear in form:
where aj and/_ >0; aj represents the maximum gross valuation by consumers in market j; qij is the number of passengers transported by airline i in market j, and /_-is the demand links; "capacity in the air" or the capacity of the air traffic control system is abundant). The average congestion costs per passenger or per flight (measured in additional travel time) at node h are assumed to increase linearly with the total frequency at the node:
where r/s is the constant slope of the congestion function and _ indicates the nodes used on links h. Note that arriving and departing movements need not contribute equally to, and suffer equally from congc_'tion. However, as we only consider return markets, we do not have to make this distinction. The congestion term (in time units) to be included in the passengg_rs" genemlize_l cost function for alternative i in marketj then is Although these assumptions may seem restrictive, many of these assumptions are quite common in the aviation economics literature. The fimctional form of the cost function used in this paper is similar to the one used byBrueckner and Spiller (1991) for an analysis of optimal airline networks 2. It is not the objective of this paper to calculate exact tolls for existing airports, for which these assumptions would clearly be too restrictive.
This paper aims to develop theoretical insights into the consequences of airport congestion pricing, for which these assumptions suffice.
THE SYMMETRIC EQUILIBRIUM
With these assumptions, we can now turn to the derivation of optimal tolls. There are three types of players in the model (passengers, airlines and regulatory authorities), each with their own maximization problem. The model is solved in three steps. First, a passenger demand function for network operator i in marketj is determined. Then, using this demand function, the airline problem is specified, and the associated profit maximizing optimality conditions
Bruecknerand Spiller (1991) do not include congestion in their cost function. 2See Brueckner (2001) for additional references.
arederived.Finally,the regulator's problem is solved, again using the passenger demand function, and also using the operator optimality conditions as restrictions.
To determine the equilibrium, we focus on a simple network with two airports and two airlines offering services in one market only (see Figure 1) . For convenience, we assume that both airlines use aircraft of similar capacity and that marginal costs per passenger (flight) are the same for both airlines. Although this assumption is not necessary to determine the equilibrium, it greatly reduces the notation. These assumptions are relaxed in a numerical exercise.
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Figure 1 Network configuration
In this network, congestion tolls are the same for both airports (due to symmetry).
Moreover,
The congestion toll cannot be distinguished from the subsidy necessary to encounter the market-power effect. Hence, only a tollt appears in the airline cost functions.
The passenger optimization problem
The maximum willingness to pay for the marginal passenger in marketj for alternative i, inclua;..mg monetized time costs, is given by equation (!) while each passenger's genera!_li ed user cost for the use of operator i are given by go(') as defined in equation (6) (7)), unused alternatives in our model will not actually be offered. By assumption, demand and generalized cost functions are linear, so that the equilibrium condition for both airlines in the simple network implies:
where at is the constant in the inverse demand function and fl is the slope of the inverse demand function. This operator specific inverse demand curve incorporates passengers'
optimizing behavior, and is used in the next step to maximize operator profits. Note that the arguments of this inverse demand function include the quantities sold by competing airline.
The transport network operator maximization problem
As stated in assumption 5, we assume Coumot behavior in modeling airline competition. This is motivated by earlier (empirical) Thus, the operators in this model maximize profits with respect to qij, taking the competitors quantities as given (note that the assumption of a fLxed passenger load implies that maximization with respect to frequencies independent of passenger numbers is neither possible nor necessary). In general, the maximization problem for operator/is:
The first-order necessary conditions for i=(1,2) are:
3For instance,in an empirical analysis of Chicago-based airline routes involving American Airlines and United Airlines, Oum et al. (1993) conclude that "the overall results indicate that the duopolists' conduct may be describedas somewhere between BertrandandCoumot behavior, but much closer to Coumot, in the majorityof the sample observations".Branderand Zhang (1990), using similar data,find " strong evidence ... against the highly competitive Bertrandhypothesis". Brander and Zhang (1990) find Cournot behavior plausible for the marketsunder consideration (Chicago-based routes where American Airlines and United Airlines together have a marketshareexceeding 75%). Based on these observations,we assumeCoumot competition.
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Each additional passenger tram_rted by airline i causes a congestion cost 2_kvot I /2 2 for both airl;-e i and airline -i. _ ikevdse, a congestion cost of 2.r/hvot p /_ is imposed on the passengers transported by both airline i and airline -i. From the first-order condition for profit maximization, it is apparent that airline i only internalizes the congestion incurred by itself or its passengers (the last LHS-term and the fourth LHS-term respectively).
Because the airlines have the same outputs in the symmetric equilibrium, it follows that the airlines internalize half of the congestion they are responsible for (the same result is obtained by Brtmckner, 2003) . Solving the first-order conditions yields the following optimal outputs:
which are positive when
The latter condition simply states that outputs are positive when the passengers' gross valuation of an airline service exceeds the average cost of the service.
From the first-order condition and the generalized cost function, we can derive the fare:
2.o,, h 1.
The first RHS-term(in square brackets) is the airline's operating costper passenger. The second RHS-term consists of a mark-up over the marginal costs of i) qi(2qh/; Xvot, + vot,/, )reflecting internalization of congestion costs and ii)qifl reflecting "residual" market power. Because airlines have market power, they are able to internalize congestion. But there is a "residual" market power effect which causes fare to exceed the welfare maximizing fare.
By construction, pl =p2, so that the fare is (after substituting the optimal values for the 
It follows from (14) that the equilibrium value for q;j is a function of the toll th if Jk, h=l. The optimal toll is determined by the regulator.
The regulator's maximization problem
From the analysis in the preceding subsection, it is clear that there is large congestion effect that is not internalized by the carriers. In this section, we formulate strategies for a regulator to "fix" problem.
In terms of objectives, we consider welfare-maximizing regulation. Since there is a market-power effect, which, considered in isolation, requires a subsidy, the resulting optimal toll may be negative. Because both airlines have the same operating characteristics, and demand is shared evenly between the carriers, a regulator will set only one toil; this toll is paid by both airlines for both the usage of both airports. In the asymmetric equilibrium, differentiated tolls th,i are necessary. Moreover, in networks with more than two nodes, it has to be acknowledged that congestion occurs at the airport level, while market power occurs at the market-level.
The global regulator maximizes surplus for the entire network: the regulator considers consumer surplus in all markets and profits of all operators. It sets a common toll t for all nodes h in the system. The authority thus maximizes the following objective function:
The first fight hand side (rhs) term represents total benefits (as integral of the Marshallian inverse demand function). The second rhs term represents total generalized costs (excluding the airline fares, which cancel out against the airline revenues). The thirdrhs term represents airline operating costs (excluding the expenditures on tolls, which cancel out against toll revenues). The three terms together thus give social surplus. The regulator sets the toll th,
given the airline (profit maximizing) optimality conditions. A change inth affects the optimal output, and thus total welfare. Substituting the airlines' optimal outputs (which are functions of th) in the welfare function and maximizing over tk yields the equilibrium in quantifies and tolls. For the network in Figure 1 , the maximization problem is: 
where the first RHS-term is the congestion that is not internalized by carrier/and the second RHS-term is the market power effect. Ideally, the toll would be set to fix both the congestion and market power problems. Following Bmeekner (2003), the regulator may set a toll that charges the airline for the congestion that is not internalized:
tC=q(vot,+v°_l tlh(}tvOtp+vOt'laFt--C'-ACq] = 3
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which is necessarily positive when q>0 (i.e. when (12) holds). Likewise, the subsidy necessary to encounter the market power effect is:
The subsidy would be given on a market level, while the toll would be levied at the airport level (and both are carrier-specific).
In the symmetric equilibrium for a network with only market, one can not distinguish between airport and market specific tolls, because both depend on the passenger flow in a single market.
A welfare maximizing regulator will thus set a toll
Condition (12) for positive qs implies that a > (c' + Ac_ )/2, so that the second term in the numerator is positive. The toll is negative when 2r/h (2votp + vot l )-f122 < 0; i.e. when the "residual" market power effect qifl in the fare-equation (13) is larger than the congestion effect qi(Erh/2Xvotp + vot,/2). Since subsidization may not be feasible in practice, so that the regulator may set a congestion toll only, as in (18). Note that this toll will not maximize welfare. In fact, to maximize welfare, output should be increased (because the market power effect dominates), while output is decreased by the toll (it can be shown that O[consumerbenefits]/at evaluated at t as given in (18) is always negative). The toll in (18) does not take into account any losses in consumer benefits Finally, using (ll), we find that the toll equals (1-flight share)×damage, as in
Brueckner (2003), when we would set airline specific tolls, although this rule has little meaning in the symmetric case. The asymmetric case, with airport specific congestion tolls and market specific subsidies, will be analyzed in the next section.
Variations on file regulator's mmiimization problem
The tolls in the previous subsection are "Tlrst-best" in the sense that total welfare is maximized without any restrictions. In practice, it may be, however, that the airlines play a Stackelberg-type of game, in which the authorities first set a welfare-maximizing congestion toll, to which the airlines then respond. In effect, welfare is them maximized with respect to the toll, aRer the optimal qs are substituted in the welfare function:
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The first-order necessary condition for welfare maximization is
The interpretation of the first-order condition is as follows. A change in t causes a change in q, and thus also the consumer benefits; this is indicated by the first LHS-term.
Furthermore, because the total number of passengers changes, total congestion costs change. This is indicated by the second LHS-term. (20), we see that the second-best (Stackelberg) toll exceeds the welfare maximizing toll. This stands to reason. When the airlines and the regulator play a Stackelberg-game (rather than the game in which the regulator sets a first-best welfare maximizing toll), airline profits will most likely be higher because airlines maximize their profits. A lower output means lesser congestion damage, so that the congestion part of the toll is lower than the congestion toll in (18). The market power subsidy will be necessarily higher (in absolute value) compared to the subsidy in (19), but because the congestion effect dominates, the overall toll is lower (in absolute value).
NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, numerical solutions for the network in Figure  1 are presented. These solutions serve two purposes. Firstly, they allow us to check the welfare effects of a pure congestion toll in a market where (symmetric) airlines have market power. Secondly, we can analyze the asymmetric equilibrium, for which the analytical solutions are more difficult to interpret.
The necessary demand characteristics are given in Table 2 ; airline characteristics in Table 3 , and airport characteristics in Table 5 contains the equilibrium for the (first-best) welfare maximizing toll (given in equation (20)). The toll is negative, and quite large in absolute value (compared to, for instance, the marginal cost per flight). This indicates that the market power effect in the notoll equilibrium exceeds the congestion effect. Because the airlines receive substantial subsidies, the optimal outputs and profits are larger than in the no-toll equilibrium. Because the optimal outputs are higher, congestion costs are also higher. In the no-toll equilibrium, the airlines set their optimal outputs too low, and as a result, the congestion costs are too low in the optimum. The welfare maximizing toll fixes this problem. The equili_um
in Table 5 may only be of academic interest, because subsidi_ng airlines may be politically rather tricky. Bmeckner (2003) suggests that the toll in such a case should be set at the level of congestion that is not internalized by the airlines (equation (18)).
This equilibrium is given in The toll is positive (as expected), and this is also reflected in consumer prices (the airlines pass the toll on to the passengers). Because the fares increase, consumer benefits decrease.
From Table 4 and fl we already concluded that in the no-toll equilibrium, the airlines set their optimal outputs, and thus also the congestion costs, too low. The 'Brueckner-toll" causes the outputs to be even lower. Combined with the decrease in consumer benefits, this leads to a decrease in total weffare. The straightforward conclusion then is that in this market the regulator should set welfare maximizing tolls. If this is not possible, the regulator should do nothing. Pure congestion tolls do more harm than good.
When we take the first-best optimum as a reference case, it could be more for the airLines to act as followers in a Stackelberg-like game with the airports authorities. The airports then set a toll to which the airlines respond; in practice, this means that the optimal outputs from the airline point of view are substituted in the regulator's objective function. The airlines thus obtain the maximum possible profits, conditional on the toll, while this is not the case in the first-best optimum. Because the airlines receive a subsidy for each passenger they move, they maximize the output up to the point where the "production" costs, including congestion costs, of the marginal passenger exceed the revenues (including subsidy). This is reflected in Table 6 . The optimal output exceeds the optimal output in the first-best optimum.
In theory, the airlines thus have an incentive to act as followers. economic wisdom suggests that congestion pricing would be an appropriate response to cope with the growing congestion levels currently experienced at many airports.
Several characteristics of aviation markets, however, may make na'fve congestion prices equal to the value of marginal travel delays a non-optimal response. This paper has developed a model of airport pricing that captures a number of these features. The model in particular reflects that airlines typically have market power and are engaged in oligopolistic competition at different sub-markets; that part of external travel delays that aircratt impose are internal to an operator and hence should not be accounted for in congestion tolls. We presented an analytical treatment for a simple bi-nodal symmetric network, which through the use of 'hyper-networks' would be readily applicable to dynamic problems (in discrete time) such as peak -off-peak differences, and some numerical exercises for the same symmetric network, which was only designed to illustrate the possible comparative static impacts of tolling, in addition to marginal equilibrium conditions as could be derived for the general model specification.
Some main conclusions are that second-best optimal tolls are typically lower than what would be suggested by congestion costs alone and may even be negative, and that the toll as derived by Brueckner (2002) may not lead to an increase in total welfare.
While Brueckner (2002) has made clear that congestion tolls on airports may be smaller than expected when congestion costs among aircraft are internal for a firm, our analysis adds to this that a further downward adjustment may be in order due to market power. The presence of market power (which causes prices to exceed marginal costs) may cause the pure congestion toll to be suboptimal, because the resulting decrease in demand is too high (the pure congestion tall does not take into account the decrease in consumer surplus).
The various downward adjustments in welfare maximizing tolls may well cause the optimal values of these to be negative. Insofar as subsidization is considered unacceptable for whichever reason, our results warn that the most efficient among the non-negative tolls may actually be a zero toll; the pure congestion toll may actually decrease welfare compared to the base case.
The model in this paper contains a few simplifying assumptions that may be relaxed in future work. Load factors and aircraft capacity are fixed in this model for simplicity. In a more advanced version of this model, load factors and aircraft capacity can be endogenized.
This makes the derivation of the optimality conditions far more complicated, but it should be feasible in a numerical experiment. One can also add a fourth layer to the model, describing the airport's optimization problem. For example, the airport can maximize profits under a cost recovery constraint. The model then deals with interactions between four types of agents. No distinction is made between peak and off-peak traffic in this paper. This distinction is quite common in the literature (see e.g. Brueckner (2002), Daniel (1995) ) and could, as discussed, of the numerical exercise in this paper need to be checked against an asymmemc equilibrium. 
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